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1Discretion and Bias in Performance Evaluation:
The Impact of Diversity and Subjectivity
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I use a proprietary archival data set of one firm to examine the
impact of performance measure diversity and the use of subjective performance measures on
performance evaluation bias. The data set used is unique in the sense that it provides detailed
information about a number of components of the subordinate-specific incentive contract,
such as, the ‘incentive weights’ for both objective and subjective performance measures and
the number of objective and subjective performance measures. The empirical results indicate
that discretion, due to performance measure diversity and subjectivity, is related to
performance evaluation bias. More specifically, I find that increased discretion is related to a
compression of performance ratings and more lenient performance ratings. These results
suggest that increasing the number of performance measures and using subjectivity in
performance evaluation make it more difficult to differentiate among subordinates, which can
lead to problems in personnel decisions and future incentives.
Key Words: Discretion, diversity, subjectivity, incentives, bias
Data Availability: The confidentiality agreement with the firm that provided the data for
this study precludes revealing its identity and disseminating data
without its written consent.
2I. INTRODUCTION
The design of incentive contracts has attracted a lot of attention in accounting
research. This research focuses on the factors that determine the use of performance measures
in incentive contracts (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1987) and the effects that these measures
have on managerial behavior (e.g., Wallace 1997). Agency theory states that any (costless)
performance measure that is informative about the agent’s effort should be used for incentive
purposes (Holmström 1979). Because no single performance measure is likely to be complete,
the informativeness principle states that incentive contracts should include multiple
performance measures. Especially the discussion about the incompleteness of financial
performance measures has led to the call for the use of multiple performance measures (e.g.,
Kaplan and Norton 1996).
Analytical studies indicate that incentive contracting can be improved by incorporating
more diverse performance measures, including the use of subjective performance measures.
For example, Feltham and Xie (1994) show that the use of alternative performance measures
can improve the effort allocation of the agent and reduce the risk imposed on the agent. Baker
et al. (1994) indicate that the combined use of objective performance measures (explicit
contracts) and subjective performance measures (implicit contracts) is, in some
circumstances, optimal. Similarly, Baiman and Rajan (1995) show that the use of contractible
(objective) and non-contractible (subjective) information in bonus pool arrangements leads to
Pareto improvements compared to a situation where only contractible information is used.
Although increasing the number of performance measures and using subjective
performance measures can provide more efficient incentives, it also provides the principal
with more discretion in performance evaluation. Most analytical studies assume that the
principal will not renege on promised incentive payments when having discretion either
because of reputation concerns (Baker et al. 1994) or because he commits to a fixed bonus
3pool (Baiman and Rajan 1995). However, superiors in organizations often are not the residual
claimants of subordinates’ outputs and therefore have no incentives to renege but rather have
incentives to bias the performance evaluation (Prendergast and Topel 1993). Research in
psychology indicates that superiors compress performance ratings and give more lenient
performance ratings when these are used for incentive purposes (Milkovich and Newman
1993; Jawahar and Williams 1997). This bias in performance evaluation is problematic
because it becomes more difficult to make the right personnel decisions, such as promotions.
The problem of bias has only relatively recently been addressed in the economics literature
(e.g., Prendergast and Topel 1993; 1996) and there is only limited empirical evidence of how
performance measurement affects bias. Given the increased call for more diverse performance
measures, including the use of subjective performance measures, it seems warranted to
examine how performance measure diversity and subjectivity affects performance evaluation
bias.
In this paper, I use a proprietary archival data set of one firm to examine the impact of
performance measure diversity and the use of subjective performance measures on
performance evaluation bias. Performance measure diversity is defined in this paper as the
number of performance measures used for incentive purposes. Subjective performance
measures, on the other hand, are defined as superior’s subjective judgements about qualitative
performance indicators. The data set used is unique in the sense that it provides detailed
information about a number of components of the subordinate-specific incentive contract,
such as, the ‘incentive weights’ for both objective and subjective performance measures and
the number of objective and subjective performance measures. The empirical results indicate
that discretion, due to performance measure diversity and subjectivity, is related to
performance evaluation bias. More specifically, I find that increased discretion is related to a
compression of performance ratings and more lenient performance ratings. These results
4suggest that increasing the number of performance measures and using subjectivity in
performance evaluation make it more difficult to differentiate among subordinates, which can
lead to problems in personnel decisions and future incentives.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is one of the few
studies that examines the effects performance measure diversity. Ittner and Larcker (1999)
examine the effects of performance measure diversity on incentive plan outcomes, such as
perceived financial benefits and plan terminations. They find little support for the benefits of
using multiple (non-financial) performance measures. This paper extends their study by
examining why this might be the case. Second, this paper addresses a topic that has recently
come to the attention of the economics literature on incentive systems, i.e., discretion and
bias, and it extends the theoretical literature by empirically examining how discretion, due to
performance measurement, affects bias in performance evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, I describe the
theoretical background and develop hypotheses. In section III, I discuss the research site,
incentive plan, and the data collection. In section IV, I present the empirical results, and
finally in section V, I discuss the implications of the empirical results for scorecard-type of
performance measurement systems and provide a summary.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Diversity, subjectivity and incentives
The dominant goal of incentive contracts is to give employees incentives to provide
effort. Agency theory predicts that by relating pay to performance, employees are motivated
to exert more effort in order to increase pay through improved performance (Holmström
1979). The incentive effects of incentive contracts are determined by the performance
measures used because employees direct their attention to those aspects of the job that are
being measured. As a result, the choice of performance measures is crucial in providing the
5correct incentives. The informativeness principle indicates that any performance measure that
provides (incremental) information about the employee’s actions should be used for incentive
purposes. Since no single performance measure is likely to be complete (Baker et al. 1994;
Kaplan and Norton 1996), the informativeness principle predicts that incentive contracting is
improved by incorporating a more diverse set of performance measures. For example,
objective performance measures, like financial performance measures, are only informative
about the measurable aspects of an employee’s job and provide no incentives for the more
qualitative aspects, like cooperation and innovation. Subjective performance measures, on the
other hand, are informative about the qualitative job aspects and are therefore of value to
incentive contracts since they provide incentives not provided by objective performance
measures (Baker et al. 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995). If objective and subjective
performance measures are informative about different aspects of the agent’s job, then the use
of both measures in incentive contracts leads to a better allocation of effort.
Furthermore, performance measure diversity can also improve incentive contracting
by reducing the risk imposed on the employee (Feltham and Xie 1994). Incentive contracts
not only provide employees with incentives to provide effort but it also imposes risk on these
employees. By relating pay to noisy measures of performance, employees’ performance is
affected by factors beyond their control and they need to be compensated for the risk imposed
on them. Feltham and Xie (1994) state that the risk imposed on employees can be reduced by
incorporating additional performance measures. They show analytically that the effect of
uncontrollable factors can be (partly) adjusted for if multiple performance measures are used
that are correlated. Thus, diversity in performance measurement not only leads to a better
allocation of effort but it also reduces the risk imposed on employees, which leads to an
improvement in the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing.
6Diversity, subjectivity and performance evaluation bias
The previous discussion of the value of diversity and subjectivity in incentive
contracts is based on agency theory, which traditionally assumes that an honest principal
contracts with an agent who can’t be trusted. The assumption of an honest principle becomes
crucial if the principal has discretion in performance evaluation and incentive contracts are
implicit (Prendergast and Topel 1993). Both subjective performance measures and diversity in
performance measurement provide superiors with discretion in performance evaluation.
Subjective performance measures provide the superior with discretion because no clear
performance standards exist for these measures and assessed performance is solely
determined by subjective judgements. Similarly, more diversity in performance measurement
gives the superior a portfolio of performance measures that is likely to consist of partly
conflicting outcomes. As a result, the superior has the opportunity to ex-post attach different
weights of importance to each measure and give a performance rating that he sees fit. If the
superior honestly reveals his subjectively assessed performance of the agent, then any implicit
contract is in fact explicit. However, this assumption appears to be inconsistent with empirical
evidence, which indicates that discretion in performance evaluation gives rise to a number of
problems (Prendergast and Topel 1993).
Although the most obvious problem seems to be reneging, which means that
contracted performance is not rewarded, the incentives to renege are often non-existent for
superiors because they are not the residual claimants of subordinates’ output (Prendergast and
Topel 1993). A more important problem is the issue of performance evaluation bias. The mere
fact that superiors are not the residual claimants implies that superiors have an opportunity to
let their preferences determine the allocation of rewards. Previous research in psychology
suggests that performance ratings are lenient when these ratings are used for administrative
purposes such as incentive pay and promotion decisions (Jawahar and Williams 1997).
7Furthermore, superiors often insufficiently differentiate among subordinates, leading to a
compression of performance ratings (Milkovich and Newman 1993). The incentives of
superiors to bias the performance evaluation of subordinates relate to the psychological cost
of communicating poor performance, favoritism, and preferences for equity in rewards
(Prendergast and Topel 1993).
Bias in performance evaluation is problematic because there are not only direct costs
associated with bias but also indirect costs. The direct costs relate to higher compensation
costs than those warranted by the ‘true’ performance of the subordinates. The indirect costs
relate to the difficulty of making important personnel decisions based on the performance
ratings and the impact of incentives on motivation. If the performance ratings are biased, then
‘all’ employees seem to be above average performers and it becomes difficult to select the
‘right’ subordinate for the ‘right’ job. Further, if subordinates become aware of the bias, they
might become less motivated and therefore provide less effort in the future. Since personnel
decisions and incentives are important determinants of firm performance, the indirect costs of
bias can be substantial and are likely to be much higher than the direct costs. Bias in
performance evaluation is therefore an important aspect to consider when designing incentive
contracts.
Although previous evidence suggests that bias in performance ratings exists when
these ratings are used for administrative purposes, there is limited evidence on how discretion,
due to differences in performance measurement, affects bias. Since diversity in performance
measurement and subjective performance measures give the superior discretion in
performance evaluation, it seems warranted to examine if performance measure diversity and
subjectivity increase performance evaluation bias. Based on the previous discussion, I state
the following hypotheses.
8H1: Increased discretion, due to performance measure diversity, increases
performance evaluation bias.
H2: Increased discretion, due to subjectivity in performance measurement,
increases performance evaluation bias.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
Research site
The research site used in this study is a privately held Dutch industrial company
focused on maritime activities. The company, hereafter called MARITCORP, was founded in
1875 and has since then always been active in shipbuilding and ship conversions.
MARITCORP is primarily located in the Netherlands, although it has also subsidiaries in
Belgium and the United Kingdom. MARITCORP has two major divisions, labeled Division A
and Division B. Division A has three sub-holdings that are focused on shipbuilding,
maintenance and repair of ships, and construction of oil and gas extraction installations for
offshore and onshore fields. Division B is primarily focused on machining of intermediate and
finished parts for ships, design and manufacturing of high-grade gear transmissions for ships,
and technical services in the field of materials and welding technology. The peripheral
activities of MARITCORP include the design, engineering and manufacturing of energy
systems and high-grade, fiber-reinforced composite structures for aerospace, shipbuilding,
wind energy, and other applications. MARITCORP currently employs approximately 1,300
employees and has sales of approximately $200 million.
Incentive plan
In 1997, MARITCORP implemented an incentive plan for their higher-level
subordinates. Previous to this implementation, subordinates’ pay was fixed and was
predominately determined by seniority. The firm stated that the incentive plan served the
following four related purposes: (1) create clear responsibilities and performance-oriented
9behavior, (2) promotion based on performance, skills and competencies, (3) employee
differentiation, and (4) performance-based compensation. That is, the firm’s goal is to give
employees incentives to provide (additional) effort and to be able to promote the ‘above
average’ performers.
The firm’s incentive plan includes approximately 160 higher-level subordinates and
consists of an annual bonus plan. The annual bonus is determined by two performance ratings,
one based on objective performance measures and one based on subjective performance
measures. For each employee, the specifics of the annual bonus plan are determined on an
annual basis and involve the following steps. First, the size of the total annual bonus as a
percentage of annual salary is determined by the human resource department and is based on
the individual’s job, education, and experience. Second, the employee’s direct superior
allocates the size of the total annual bonus to the two types of performance measures. Third,
the superior chooses the number of measures in each performance dimension. Finally, each
performance dimension is evaluated ex-post and the actual annual bonus is split into two
different payments; one based on ‘objective’ performance and one based on ‘subjective’
performance. Performance ratings for these dimensions are made on a scale from zero to
100%, where 100% means full bonus payment.
Data
The firm provided me with proprietary archival data related to the plan’s second year,
i.e., 1998. Data are available with respect to the (1) compensation risk (total, objective, and
subjective), (2) number of performance measures (total, objective, and subjective), and (3)
bonus-related performance ratings (objective and subjective).1 Data on the size of the
compensation risk is available for 141 subordinates. The mean total compensation risk,
                                                
1 The data provided do not relate to all employees included in the incentive plan because some compensation
documents received by the human resource department were incomplete.
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measured by the target annual bonus divided by annual salary, is 8.1%, i.e., approximately
one month’s salary. Although this might seem low compared to US standards, it is a
significant incentive for MARITCORP’s subordinates given that the firm moved from no
performance evaluation and fixed pay to performance-based compensation. The mean
compensation risk based on objective performance measures equals 4.3% of salary, while the
mean compensation risk based on subjective performance measures equals 3.8%. The mean
percentage point difference between the subjective and objective compensation risk, which
reflects the relative use of subjectivity for incentive purposes, equals –0.6% and is
significantly different from zero (two-tail p<0.01). This means that, on average, superiors rely
more on objective performance measures relative to subjective performance measures for
incentive purposes. This result is consistent with previous research, which finds that superiors
have a general tendency to rely more on objective performance measures (e.g., Ittner et al.
1999).
Data on the number of performance measures are available for 128 of the 141
employees. The mean total number of performance measures used is 4.7, which consists of
2.3 objective performance measures and 2.5 subjective performance measures. The difference
between the number of objective and subjective performance measures is statistically
significant (two-tail p<0.05), which indicates that, on average, superiors use more subjective
performance measures than objective performance measures.2
Bonus-related performance ratings are available for 141 employees. The mean overall
performance rating is 59.8%, which means that, on average, approximately 60% of the
maximum annual bonus is actually paid. The mean objective (subjective) performance rating
equals 60.3% (58.9%).
                                                
2 These results suggest that the number of performance measures used in each performance dimension does not
reflect its relative importance for incentive purposes.
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Table 1 provides the summary statistics for all variables used in this paper.
------------
Insert TABLE 1 about here
------------
Proxies for discretion
The prediction that performance measure diversity and subjectivity leads to
performance evaluation bias is based on the assumption that both diversity and subjectivity
increases discretion. I therefore use the following two proxies for discretion. First, the use of
subjective performance measures allows more discretion in performance evaluation than the
use of objective performance measures. This implies that the higher the relative importance of
subjective performance measures for incentive purposes the higher the discretion. As a result,
I split the sample into two groups based on the mean relative compensation risk based on
subjectivity. The subgroup of low (high) relative compensation risk based on subjectivity
proxies for low (high) discretion.
Second, although the use of objective performance measures allows less discretion
than the use of subjective performance measures, increasing the number of objective
performance measures adds a subjective component. The use of multiple objective
performance measures provides the superior with an opportunity to attach subjective weights
to the different performance measures, which increases discretion. I therefore split the sample
into two subgroups of low and high discretion. The low discretion subgroup consists of
subordinates who are evaluated on a single objective performance measure, while the high
discretion subgroup consists of subordinates who are evaluated on multiple objective
performance measures.
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Measurement of bias
I measure performance evaluation bias by analyzing and comparing the moments of
the distribution of performance ratings for the different subgroups identified above. More
specifically, I examine the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the distributions.
Evidence of bias, due to increased discretion, exists when the mean is higher, the standard
deviation is lower, and there is more negative skewness in the high discretion subgroup
compared to the low discretion subgroup, ceteris paribus. A higher mean and more negative
skewness implies more lenient performance ratings, while a lower standard deviation implies
greater compression of performance ratings.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Diversity, discretion and performance evaluation bias
In order to examine whether diversity in performance measurement affects
performance evaluation bias, I first regress the objective and subjective performance rating on
respectively the number of objective and subjective performance measures. I include the
compensation risk based on respectively the objective and subjective performance measures
in the regression to control for the differences in incentives provided. The results, presented in
Table 2, indicate that the objective performance rating is positively related to both the number
of objective performance measures (two-tail p<0.10) and the compensation risk based on
objective performance measures (two-tail p<0.05). The subjective performance rating, on the
other hand, is not affected by either the number of subjective performance measures or
compensation risk. If the performance ratings reflect the ‘true’ performance of subordinates,
then these results suggest that annual bonus plans and performance measure diversity are
effective when performance is measured objectively but not effective when performance is
subjectively assessed. However, a more plausible explanation for the lack of significant
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results with respect to the subjective performance ratings is that superiors have significant
discretion in this situation and that the performance ratings are biased.
------------
Insert TABLE 2 about here
------------
Given that bias is likely to be present in the performance ratings observed, this raises
the question whether the significant positive effect of the number of objective performance
measures on the objective performance rating is due to the ‘economic value’ of performance
measure diversity or due to discretion and bias. That is, although agency theory predicts that
performance measure diversity positively affects performance, diversity in performance
measurement also provides the superior with discretion, which might lead to bias and thus
higher performance ratings. If the economic value of performance measure diversity drives
the results in Table 2, then the same results should hold when superiors have discretion in
performance evaluation. I therefore regress the objective performance rating on the number of
objective performance measures and compensation risk for the subgroup of subordinates who
are evaluated on multiple objective performance measures. Table 3 shows that the objective
performance rating and the number of objective performance measures are not related when
superiors have discretion. This implies that the results in Table 2 are not due to a gradual
increase in the number of performance measures but due to a move from a single performance
measure to multiple performance measures, i.e., discretion.
------------
Insert TABLE 3 about here
------------
Although the previous results indicate that the objective performance rating is
positively related to discretion, this does not necessarily mean that the performance ratings are
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biased. To examine whether the performance ratings are biased, I analyze the distribution of
the objective performance ratings for subgroups of low discretion and high discretion, where
these subgroups are based on the number of objective performance measures. It is important
to note that the distribution of the compensation risk for these two sub-samples shows no
significant differences. Therefore, any observed differences in the distribution of objective
performance ratings cannot be explained by differences in incentives provided.
Panel A of Table 4 presents the distribution of the objective performance ratings for
the subgroup with no discretion. The mean objective performance rating is 47%, which
implies that, on average, almost half of the annual bonus based on objective performance
measures is paid. The standard deviation of the distribution is 37%, while the distribution is
symmetric in the sense that the number of observations below or above the mean is equal.
Further, comparing the mean to scale midpoint, which is often used as a benchmark to
evaluate leniency, indicates no significant difference. Since the distribution of this subgroup is
most likely to approximate the distribution of ‘true’ performance, it provides evidence that,
contrary to recent criticism (e.g., Kane et al. 1995), the scale midpoint is in fact a valid
indicator of ‘average performance’ and therefore useful as a benchmark to evaluate leniency.
Overall, the results suggest that the performance ratings in the low discretion subgroup are not
lenient.
The distribution of the objective performance ratings for the subgroup with high
discretion is shown in Panel B of Table 4. The mean objective performance rating equals 65%
and is significantly different from the scale midpoint (two-tail p<0.01). The standard
deviation equals 27%, the distribution is mildly negatively skewed, and more than two-thirds
of the observations are above the scale midpoint. These results indicate that the performance
ratings are lenient when the superior has discretion.
15
Comparing the different moments of the distributions between the two subgroups
shows first of all that the mean objective performance rating is higher for the subgroup with
high discretion (two-tail p<0.01). On average, the subordinates in the high discretion
subgroup get paid an additional 18% of their maximum annual bonus based on objective
performance measures. Second, the variance in performance ratings is significantly lower for
the subgroup with high discretion (two-tail p<0.01). This implies that there is significantly
more compression of performance ratings and therefore less differentiation among
subordinates in the high discretion subgroup. Finally, the distribution of objective
performance ratings is more negatively skewed for the subgroup with high discretion.
Taken together, the empirical results lend support for hypothesis 1, which suggest that
discretion, due to performance measure diversity, leads to both leniency and a compression of
performance ratings.
------------
Insert TABLE 4 about here
------------
Subjectivity, discretion and performance evaluation bias
The results in Table 2 and, more specifically, the lack of significant results regarding
the subjective performance ratings provide a first indication that subjectivity leads to bias. In
order to examine to what extent discretion, due to an increased use of subjectivity, affects
performance evaluation bias, I analyze the distribution of the overall performance rating for
subgroups of low and high relative compensation risk based on subjectivity. Once again, a
low (high) relative compensation risk based on subjectivity indicates low (high) discretion in
performance evaluation.
The distribution for the low discretion subgroup, shown in Panel A of Table 5,
indicates that the mean overall performance rating is 56%, which is not significantly different
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from the scale midpoint. The standard deviation of the distribution equals 28% and the
distribution is somewhat negatively skewed with approximately 59% of the observations
above the scale midpoint. Panel B of Table 5 presents the distribution of the overall
performance rating for the high discretion subgroup. The results show that the mean overall
performance rating is 63%, which is significantly different from the scale midpoint (two-tail
p<0.01), while the standard deviation equals 24%. The distribution is mildly negatively
skewed and approximately 75% of the observations above the scale midpoint.
Comparing the distributions for the low and high discretion subgroups indicates the
following. First, the mean overall performance rating for the high discretion subgroup is
higher than the mean rating for the low discretion subgroup, although the difference is only
marginally significant (two-tail p=0.11). Second, there is greater compression of performance
ratings and less differentiation among the subordinates when discretion is high compared to
when discretion is low, reflected by the lower variance of the overall performance rating for
the high discretion subgroup (two-tail p<0.10). Finally, the distribution for the high discretion
subgroup is more negatively skewed than the distribution for the low discretion subgroup,
which indicates higher leniency in the high discretion subgroup.
------------
Insert TABLE 5 about here
------------
The previous analysis is based on the assumption that the higher the relative
compensation risk based on subjectivity the higher the discretion. However, the empirical
results with respect to diversity indicate that using multiple objective performance measures
also provides superiors with discretion. This implies that the differences in the distribution of
the overall performance rating for low and high relative compensation risk based on
subjectivity should be less pronounced for those subordinates who are evaluated on multiple
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objective performance measures. I therefore re-run the analysis for this particular sub-set.
Table 6 shows the results of this additional analysis and indicates that the difference in means
for the two subgroups becomes less significant (two-tail p=0.15). Further, the difference in the
variances of the overall performance ratings for the two subgroups becomes not significant,
while there is a small decrease in the difference in negative skewness between the two
distributions. These results are consistent with the expectation that the impact of subjectivity
on performance evaluation bias becomes less pronounced when superiors use multiple
objective performance measures to evaluate subordinates.
------------
Insert TABLE 6 about here
------------
In sum, the empirical results suggest that greater subjectivity in performance
evaluation leads to more lenient performance ratings and a compression of performance
ratings, which provides support for hypothesis 2.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
The empirical results presented in the previous section have some important
implications for scorecard-type of performance measurement and reward systems. These
systems are characterized by multiple performance measures (diversity) and an increased use
of subjectivity (e.g., Ittner et al. 1999). Furthermore, the purpose of these systems is to
motivate employees to improve performance and to differentiate among employees based on
their ability and skills so as to make better promotion decisions. Previous empirical research
indicates that when multiple performance measures are available and superiors have
discretion in ‘weighting’ the different performance measures, there is a general tendency to
put more weight on objective and common measures of performance, which results in less
‘balance’ (e.g., Ittner et al. 1999; Lipe and Salterio 2000). The empirical results in this paper
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indicate an additional problem with the use of multiple performance measures and
subjectivity. First, the results show that performance measure diversity leads to more lenient
performance ratings and less differentiation among employees. Kaplan and Norton’s (2001)
claim that, although the Balanced Scorecard should be used as a ‘strategic management
system’, it can be linked to incentive compensation. They state that ‘compensation can be
based on 25 strategic measures’ without causing problems (2001,152). However, this is more
than five times the mean number of performance measures and almost three times the
maximum number of performance measures used in the research site examined in this paper.
It is therefore questionable whether a Balanced Scorecard that includes a large number of
performance measures is effective as a performance measurement and reward system.
Second, Kaplan and Norton (1996) state that a balanced scorecard with multiple
performance measures makes the use of subjectivity for incentive purposes easier. However,
the empirical results indicate that subjectivity also leads to bias in performance evaluation.
That is, if more subjectivity is used in evaluating and rewarding employees, superiors give
higher performance ratings and compress these ratings. As a result, the firm is unable to
separate the highly skilled employees from the less skilled employees. If skills and
competencies are important determinants of promotions, then the use of subjective
performance measures makes these promotion decisions more difficult.
As with any empirical study, this study has its limitations. First, the data do not allow
me to examine the behavior of individual superiors and the analysis therefore assumes that all
superiors behave in an identical way. Although research in psychology indicates that superiors
have a general tendency to bias the performance ratings, it might be that superior-specific
characteristics influence bias and future research can address these issues. Second, because
the data are cross-sectional data of a single year, I am unable to examine to what extent
performance evaluation bias persists and whether the firm actually incurs the assumed indirect
19
costs of bias. An opportunity for future research is therefore to gather time-series data and to
examine to what extent performance evaluation bias affects, for example, motivation. Finally,
the data relate to a single firm. Using data from a single firm controls for ‘other’ factors that
can affect performance evaluation bias but it reduces the generalizability of the results. Future
research can examine to what extent the findings in this paper are generalizable by gathering
data from multiple firms.
20
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min-max n
Total compensation risk 8.1% 2.0% 3.00 – 15.00 141
Compensation risk based on objective
performance measuresa 4.3% 1.5% 0.00 – 9.38 141
Compensation risk based on subjective
performance measuresa 3.8% 1.2% 0.00 – 7.00 141
Total # of performance measures 4.7 1.5 2.00 – 9.00 128
# of objective performance measures 2.3 0.8 1.00 – 5.00 127
# of subjective performance measures 2.5 0.9 1.00 – 6.00 125
Overall performance rating 59.8% 25.6% 0.00 – 100 141
Objective performance rating 60.3% 30.3% 0.00 – 100 140
Subjective performance rating 58.9% 26.8% 0.00 – 100 138
aOne subordinate is not evaluated on objective performance measures, while three subordinates are not evaluated
on subjective performance measures.
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TABLE 2
The Effect of Diversity and Compensation Risk on Performance Ratings
(t-statistics are in parentheses)
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Objective
Performance
Rating
Subjective
Performance
Rating
Intercept 30.70***
(3.09)
52.60***
(5.91)
# of OPM 6.20*
(1.94)
Compensation risk based on OPM 3.90**
(2.20)
# of SPM -0.08
(-0.03)
Compensation risk based on SPM 2.05
(0.92)
Adjusted R-square 0.06 -0.01
F-statistic 5.27*** 0.50
Sample size 127 125
***, **, * is statistically significant at respectively the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed).
OPM = objective performance measures
SPM = subjective performance measures
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TABLE 3
The Effect of Diversity and Compensation Risk on Objective Performance Ratings
when Superiors Have Discretion in Performance Evaluation
(t-statistics are in parentheses)
Independent Variable
Objective
Performance
Rating
Intercept 44.30***
(3.47)
# of OPM 2.29
(0.55)
Compensation risk based on OPM 3.31*
(1.72)
Adjusted R-square 0.02
F-statistic 1.84
Sample sizea 106
***, **, * is statistically significant at respectively the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed).
OPM = objective performance measures
aThe sample consists of those subordinates who are evaluated on multiple objective performance measures.
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TABLE 4
Moments of the Distribution of Objective Performance Ratings
for Subgroups of Low and High Discretion in Performance Evaluation
Panel A: Low discretion (evaluation based on single objective performance measure)
1,00,88,75,63,50,38,25,130,00
5
4
3
2
1
0
n Mean St.Dev. Skewness
% of
observations
below scale
midpoint
% of
observations
at scale
midpoint
% of
observations
above scale
midpoint
21 47%a,b 37%d 0.036 43% 14% 43%
Panel B: High discretion (evaluation based on multiple objective performance measures)
1,00,88,75,63,50,38,25,130,00
30
20
10
0
n Mean St.Dev. Skewness
% of
observations
below scale
midpoint
% of
observations
at scale
midpoint
% of
observations
above scale
midpoint
106 65%b,c 27%d -0.830 17% 15% 68%
aNot significantly different from the scale midpoint.
bMean for the low discretion subgroup is significantly lower than the mean for the high discretion subgroup
(two-tail p<0.01).
cSignificantly different from the scale midpoint (two-tail p<0.01).
dStandard deviation for the low discretion subgroup is significantly higher than the standard deviation for the
high discretion subgroup (two-tail p<0.01).
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TABLE 5
Moments of the Distribution of Overall Performance Ratings
for Subgroups of Low and High Discretion in Performance Evaluation
Panel A: Low discretion (low relative compensation risk based on subjectivity)
1,00
,94
,88
,81
,75
,69
,63
,56
,50
,44
,38
,31
,25
,19
,13
,06
0,00
10
8
6
4
2
0
n Mean St.Dev. Skewness
% of
observations
below scale
midpoint
% of
observations
at scale
midpoint
% of
observations
above scale
midpoint
58 56%a,b 28%d -0.579 33% 9% 59%
Panel B: High discretion (high relative compensation risk based on subjectivity)
1,00
,94
,88
,81
,75
,69
,63
,56
,50
,44
,38
,31
,25
,19
,13
,06
0,00
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
n Mean St.Dev. Skewness
% of
observations
below scale
midpoint
% of
observations
at scale
midpoint
% of
observations
above scale
midpoint
83 63%b,c 24%d -0.862 18% 7% 75%
aNot significantly different from the scale midpoint.
bThe difference in the mean for the low discretion subgroup and high discretion subgroup is marginally
significant (two-tail p=0.11).
cSignificantly different from the scale midpoint (two-tail p<0.01).
dStandard deviation for the low discretion subgroup is significantly higher than the standard deviation for the
high discretion subgroup (two-tail p<0.10).
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TABLE 6
Moments of the Distribution of Overall Performance Ratings
for Subgroups of Low and High Relative Compensation Risk Based on Subjectivity
Given the Use of Multiple Objective Performance Measures
Panel A: Low relative compensation risk based on subjectivity
1,00
,94
,88
,81
,75
,69
,63
,56
,50
,44
,38
,31
,25
,19
,13
,06
0,00
10
8
6
4
2
0
n Mean St.Dev. Skewness
% of
observations
below scale
midpoint
% of
observations
at scale
midpoint
% of
observations
above scale
midpoint
49 59%a,b 25%d -0.801 27% 10% 63%
Panel B: High relative compensation risk based on subjectivity
1,00
,94
,88
,81
,75
,69
,63
,56
,50
,44
,38
,31
,25
,19
,13
,06
0,00
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
n Mean St.Dev. Skewness
% of
observations
below scale
midpoint
% of
observations
at scale
midpoint
% of
observations
above scale
midpoint
57 66%b,c 23%d -1.106 12% 9% 79%
aSignificantly different from the scale midpoint (two-tail p<0.05).
bThe difference in the mean for the ‘low’ subgroup and ‘high’ subgroup is marginally significant (two-tail
p=0.15).
cSignificantly different from the scale midpoint (two-tail p<0.01).
dStandard deviation for the ‘low’ subgroup is not significantly different from the standard deviation for the
‘high’ subgroup.
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